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ABSTRACT
Financial statement frauds (FSF) are becoming rampant phenomena in current economic and financial landscapes. One 
of the ways to curb FSF is to detect them early so that preventive measures can be applied. This study aims to empirically 
investigate the abilities of two financial-based models namely the Beneish’s M-score and Dechow’s F-score, to detect and 
predict FSF for Malaysian companies. In addition, this study compares the accuracy including the error rates between 
the two models. Financial data of Malaysian listed companies from 2001 to 2014 are used using a matched pair in this 
study. The findings reveal that both Beneish and Dechow models are effective in predicting both the fraudulent and 
non-fraudulent companies with average accuracy at 73.17% and 76.22%, respectively. The results also indicate that 
Dechow F-score model outperforms the Beneish M-score model in the sensitivity of predicting fraud cases with 73.17% 
compared to 69.51%. On the efficiency aspect, the Dechow F Score model is found to have lower type II error (26.83%) 
than Beneish M Score model (30.49%). This finding suggests that Dechow F Score model is a better model that can be 
used by the regulators to detect FSF among companies in Malaysia.
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INTRODUCTION
Fraud is a significant threat to businesses worldwide. 
The reports by Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
(ACFE) suggest that the occurrence of fraud has increased 
considerably over the recent years and is likely to continue 
to increase in the future (ACFE 2014, 2012, 2010). The 
reports and the reported cases of fraud involving Enron, 
Worldcom and Satyam resulted in losses estimated to be 
more than US$20 billion. According to ACFE, there are 
three types of fraud comprising financial reporting fraud, 
misappropriation of assets, and corruption. Amongst 
different types of fraud, it is reported that financial 
statement fraud contributes the highest loss compared 
to other reported corruption and asset misappropriation 
fraud cases (ACFE 2014). Malaysia is not spared as cases 
involving Megan Media, Transmile Berhad, United U-Li 
and Repco Holdings Bhd proved that fraud is prevalent 
here too. Organizations are reported to lose an estimated 
average of 6 percent of their annual revenues due to 
fraud. Due to increasing the number of fraud cases and 
its detrimental negative impacts, it is vital to spend a 
significant amount of time to find an effective model to 
detect fraud. 
 Several researchers suggest that financial ratios are 
effective in fraud detection (Bai et al. 2008; Subramanyam 
& Wild 2009; Dalnial et al. 2014). In contrast, Kaminski et 
al. (2004) concluded differently in which they argued on the 
limitations of financial ratios. The results on effectiveness 
of financial ratios on fraud detection are mixed. 
 Several models such as Beneish and Dechow F-score, 
use different financial ratios for fraud detection. The 
application of these models are mostly in detecting earning 
manipulation but their abilities in financial statement fraud 
detection are also confirmed by prior studies. The objective 
of this paper is to compare the detection power between 
Beneish model and Dechow F-score model for financial 
statement fraud in Malaysia. These models were originally 
developed using United States (US) data and different 
financial ratios. Although the usefulness of these models in 
detecting financial statement fraud have been ascertained 
separately in prior studies, the models’ abilities are yet 
to be compared in determining which model provides 
better results (Nwoye et al. 2013; Omar et al. 2014). In 
addition, as both the Baneish and Dechow models were 
recently developed, there is still limited evidence that can 
affirm the models’ abilities to detect fraud incidences in a 
developing country like Malaysia. There are many reasons 
why Malaysian data on fraud are considered unique. Firstly, 
the regulatory regime in Malaysia is considered lax (Aluko 
& Bagheri 2012). This is compared to its counterpart 
the US, where the models were first developed. A lax 
regulatory regime may create an environment whereby 
the occurrences of financial statements fraud may be 
more rampant in the US. Secondly, Malaysia and US apply 
different financial reporting standards, and therefore there 
will be differences in arriving at the financial data reported 
in the financial statements. These differences may affect 
each model’s ability to predict fraud, hence this study is 
warranted.
 This paper is constructed as follows: the next section 
reviews the literature of fraud. This is followed by 
explanation on the mechanics of Beneish and Dechow 
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F-score models. Comparison between these models is 
discussed in the subsequent section. The last section 
presents the conclusion. 
FRAUD LITERATURE
This section presents fraud literature, its evolution and 
current statistics of fraud.
FRAUD DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATIONS
Fraud is defined as a deliberate performance by individuals, 
which results in misrepresentation of financial statement 
(KPMG 2005; ACFE 2008). The American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners (2008), The Institute of Internal Auditors, 
and Malaysian Approved Standards on Auditing (ISA 240) 
defined fraud similarly as a deliberate performance by 
individuals, which results in misrepresentation of financial 
statement. Asare (2006) explained that although fraud 
does not have exact legal meaning, it can be defined as 
“a situation where a person appropriates by deception 
a property belonging to another with the intention of 
permanently depriving the other of it”. The term fraud 
has been described by researchers in different forms, but 
generally it is believed that fraud can be defined ultimately 
as “the intentional act of misleading or committing harm 
to others with the aim of securing an unfair or unlawful 
advantage”. 
 Prior studies had identified different types of fraud 
from various perspectives. For instance, fraud can be 
external which is committed by a client or other third 
parties or internal, which is committed by employees 
or managers. The Malaysian Approved Standards on 
Auditing, AI 700 outlines two forms of fraud including 
fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of 
assets (Jaffar et al. 2008). Fraud can also be classified 
based on its nature. A joint-report by The Institute of 
Internal Auditors, American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants and ACFE (2008) categorized fraud into 
financial reporting fraud, misappropriation of assets, and 
corruption.
 Financial reporting fraud, one major type of fraud, 
involves intentional misstatement or omission of material 
information from the organisation’s financial report. In 
accordance with ACFE (2014), only 9% of fraud cases 
involved financial statement fraud; but those cases caused 
the greatest financial impact, with a median loss of US$1 
million. Therefore, finding ways to detect financial 
statement fraud early to prevent further damage to the 
organization is crucial. 
FRAUD STATISTICS
The stability of a business can be in danger as the result 
of significant financial losses due to fraud. It is reported 
that organizations lose 6% of their revenues because of 
fraud yearly (ACFE 2014). The statistics below indicate the 
frequency and losses from three types of fraud determined 
by ACFE from 2010 to 2014. This evidence reveals that the 
frequency of asset misappropriation or employee fraud has 
decreased in recent years. In contrast, both corruption and 
financial statement fraud have increased considerably and 
they are likely to continue unless a drastic measure can be 
found to curb them. 
 Similar to other countries, Malaysia is not exempted 
from fraud occurrence. The number of fraud cases reported 
had increased during the time. Statistics reported by 
Securities Commision (SC), Malaysia for the year 2006 
and 2007 showed that there were 10 and fourteen 14 
enforcement actions respectively. The reports for years 
2009 and 2010 by this commission indicated an increase 
in fraud cases at 18 and 26 cases, respectively (Hasnan et 
al. 2012). Reports such as Pricewaterhorse Coopers (PwC) 
(2009, 2011) revealed a considerable decrease in financial 
performance among Malaysian companies of more than 
60 percent (66%) due to fraud. KPMG (2013) reported that 
89% of the respondents believed that fraud cases have been 
increasing over the past three years. It is also indicated 
that 42% of the reported fraud incidents were within the 
range of RM10,001 to RM100,000. The reviewed evidences 
show that fraud remains a problematic issue in Malaysia. 
Therefore, a useful and appropriate tool is needed to solve 
this problem. 
FRAUD DETECTION
Despite the reports of the ACFE, most frauds are not 
detected in time because they are normally hidden from 
the eyes of the public or even the auditors. The high 
losses due to fraud reported by different organizations 
also confirmed failure in detection. Therefore, an effective 
tool is required to identify the signals of fraud. There are 
a number of tools developed to assist regulators as well as 
auditors in analyzing financial statements and assessing 
TABLE 1. Frequency and median loss of different types of fraud
Types Asset misappropriation Corruption Fraudulent Financial Reporting
Year 
Frequency 
(Percent)
Median loss 
(USD ‘M)
Frequency 
(Percent)
Median loss 
(USD ‘M)
Frequency 
(Percent)
Median loss 
(USD ‘M)
2010
2012
2014
86.3 
86.7 
85.4
0.135
0.12
0.13
32.8
33.4
36.8
0.25
0.25
0.20
4.8
7.6
9.0
4.1
1.0
1.0 
Source: ACFE (2014)
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likelihood of fraud occurrences. Models consisting 
financial ratios are found to be the most common models 
developed for fraud detection. According to prior studies, 
these ratios are widely used and suggested to be a 
useful tool in business failure forecast, fraud detection 
and performance evaluation (Green & Calderon 1995; 
Green & Choi 1997; Guan et al. 2008; Persons 2011; 
Dani et al. 2013; Omoye & Eragbhe 2014; Dalnial et al. 
2014; Kanapickienė & Grundienė 2015). The literature 
suggests a variety of ratios including financial leverage, 
profitability, asset composition and liquidity. Recent 
studies such as Omar et al. (2014), Omoye and Eragbhe 
(2014) and Nia (2015) had expanded on the types of 
financial used in the models and confirmed the ability of 
these financial ratios to detect fraud. Kotsiantis et al. 2006 
used profitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and cash 
flow to predict financial statement frauds; while Dechow 
et al. (2011), and Kaminski et al. (2004) applied other 
financial ratios in their respective models to predict fraud. 
 Various models using financial ratios have been 
developed by accounting research to predict different 
events including fraud, earning manipulation, earning 
management and bankruptcy. These models include 
Beneish, Jones model, Altman Z-Score and Dechow 
F-score (Jansen et al. 2012). This paper aims to compare 
the ability of two of these models, namely Beneish 
and Dechow F-score models in detecting fraud using 
Malaysian data. 
RESEARCH METHOD
This study examines 164 samples consisting of 82 
fraudulent and 82 non-fraudulent companies from the 
Malaysian Public Listed companies available between the 
years 2000 and 2014 with financial data collected from 
Osiris and annual reports. Samples classified as fraudulent 
companies are companies that have been reported to have 
fraud in the enforcement releases obtained from SC. A 
matched pair samples is used; whereby each fraudulent 
company is matched with a corresponding non fraudulent 
firm on the basis of industry obtained from the SIC code 
and financial year. Financial statement variables of non-
fraudulent companies are obtained from the same year as 
the fraudulent companies in order to control for general 
macroeconomics conditions. This one-for-one matching 
process is used in an effort to enhance the discriminatory 
power of the models. 
 The following section evaluates the ability of Beneish 
and Dechow F-score models in detecting fraud using 
collected data. 
BENEISH MODEL
Beneish Model or Beneish M-score is the manipulation 
score created by Beneish (1997, 1999). It is a mathematical 
model that uses eight financial ratios to identify 
manipulated earnings and to detect financial statement 
fraud (Jansen et al. 2012). The variables are constructed 
from the company’s financial statements and a score is 
derived from the model to describe the degree to which 
the earnings have been manipulated (Nwoye et al. 2013). 
Beneish (1999) profiled firms that are likely to manipulate 
earnings (firms either charged with manipulation by the 
SEC, or admitted to manipulation in the public press) and 
developed a statistical model to discriminate manipulators 
from non-manipulators. Therefore, this model helps to 
uncover companies that are likely to manipulate their 
reported earnings. Furthermore, Beneish and Nichols 
(2009) refined this model with five and eight variables 
for detecting financial statement fraud. Eight variables of 
Beneish model are explained in Table 2 and calculated 
using following formula:
M = -4.84 + 0.92*DSRI + 0.528*GMI + 0.404*AQI 
+ 0.892*SGI + 0.115*DEPI – 0.172*SGAI + 
4.679*TATA – 0.327*LVGI
 The M score is the derived figure from the model. 
M-score of less than -2.22 indicates that a company does 
not manipulate the financial statements in the accounting 
period. M-score greater than -2.22 signals that the company 
will likely be a manipulator.
 These parameters are calculated from data in company 
financial reports issued in two consecutive years. Hence, 
the following data are needed: Sales, Cost of Goods, 
Net Receivables, Current Assets, Property, Plant and 
Equipment, Depreciation, Total Assets, Selling, General 
and Administrative Expenses, Net Income, Cash Flow 
from Operations, Current Liabilities and Long-Term Debt.
The calculations of eight ratios are given in the following 
table:
TABLE 2. Ratio analyses used as Beneish M-score
Ratio Formula 
DSRI (Net Receivablest / Sales t) / (Net Receivablest-1 / Sales t-1)
GMI [(Salest-1 – Cost of Goods Sold t-1) / Sales t-1] / [(Salest 
– Cost of Goods Sold t) / Sales t]
AQI [1 – (Current Assetst + PPE t / Total Asset t )] / [1 – 
(Current Assetst -1 + PPE t-1 / Total Assett-1 )]
SGI Sales t / Sales t-1
DEPI [Depreciation t-1 /  Depreciationt−1 + PPEt−1] / 
[Depreciationt / Depreciationt + PPEt]
SGAI [sales, general and administrative expenses t / Sales t] / 
[sales, general and administrative expenses t-1 / Sales t-1]
TATA Total Accrualst / Total Assetst
LEVI
 
[LTDt + Current Liabilitiest / Total Assets t ] / [LTDt−1 
+ Current Liabilitiest−1 / Total Assetst−1]
Source: Beneish (1999)
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The explanation of each ratio used in the model is explained 
below:
1. Days Sales in Receivables Index (DSRI)
 Measured as the change in receivables in the first 
year that the manipulation is discovered (year t) by 
comparing them with the same measure in year t-1 
according to sales. It measures whether the receivables 
and revenues are in balance in two successive years. 
As long as there is no extreme change in the policy 
of credit sales of the company, this index is expected 
to have a linear structure. An important increase 
in this index is based not only on the accountancy 
of consignment sales recorded as trade receivables 
and sales toward the increase in income as well as 
profit of the company, but also on the creation of 
trade receivables from current accounts of group 
companies. These two applications are considered 
as the indicators of the manipulation of financial 
information. According to Beneish (1997) a large 
increase in days’ sales in receivables could be the 
result of a change in credit policy to spur sales in the 
face of increased competition, but disproportionate 
increases in receivables relative to sales could also 
suggest revenue inflation. As a consequence, it is 
expected that a large increase in receivables increases 
the likelihood of earnings manipulation. 
2. Gross Margin Index (GMI)
 Measured as a ratio of total sales revenue minus 
the cost of goods sold divided by sales in year t-1 
to the corresponding measurement in year t. A GMI 
above 1 indicates a decline in gross margins, which 
in turns is related to poorer business prospects and 
a higher probability of manipulation. Dikmen and 
Küçükkocaoğlu (2010) suggested that GMI and the 
probability of earnings manipulation are positively 
correlated. 
3. Asset Quality Index (AQI)
 This measure is the percentage of total assets that 
are intangible assets this year divided by the same 
percentage calculation for last year. An increase in this 
index may represent additional expenses that are being 
capitalized to preserve profitability. An increase in this 
measure is predicted to increase the probability of 
manipulation. An AQI greater than 1.0 indicates that the 
company has potentially increased its cost deferral or 
increased its intangible assets, and committed earnings 
manipulation (Warshavsky 2012). Asset quality index 
and financial information manipulation are suggested 
to be positively correlated.
4. Sales Growth Index (SGI) 
 The index is a measure of growth in revenue in one 
year over revenue of a prior year. An index greater than 
1.0 represents a positive growth while less than 1.0 
represents a negative growth in the year under review. 
Though other factors may be responsible, growth in 
sales does not necessarily prove the manipulation of 
financial information. According to prior studies such 
as Dikmen & Küçükkocaoğlub (2010), companies 
that take sales growth into account are more likely 
to have earning manipulation compared to other 
companies. This happens due to the structure of debt 
or equity and the needs of resources which resulted in 
pressure on managers to have high rate of sales in their 
companies. This pressure will increase if the prices of 
stock decrease, and in turn manipulation of financial 
statements increases. 
5. Depreciation Index (DEPI)
 This variable is computed as the rate of depreciation 
in year t-1 divided by the depreciation rate in year t, 
with the rationale that lower depreciation expenses 
results in more discretion over income; and thus a 
higher probability of manipulation. If this proportion 
is greater than 1, it is suggested that the company 
reduces its depreciation expenses to have high 
profit by considering that the expected useful life of 
plant, property and equipment will be lengthened or 
depreciation method will be changed in order to reduce 
expenses. 
6. Sales, General and Administration Index (SGAI)
 Since the relationship between SG&A and sales is 
known to be quite static, it is alarming when SG&A 
expenses increase without a simultaneous increase in 
sales. Calculated as a ratio of SG&A to sales in year 
1 relative to the corresponding measure in year t-1, it 
is expected that a higher SGAI increases the likelihood 
of manipulation.
7. Total Accruals to Total Assets Index (TATA)
 This index is  used to measure the extent 
to which sales are made on cash basis. It is an 
indication of the quality of cash flows of the company. 
The total accruals metric is computed as change in 
working capital (except cash) less depreciation for 
the year under review adjusted for changes in income 
tax payable and current portion of long term debt. An 
increasing degree of accruals as part of total assets 
would indicate a higher chance of manipulation 
(Prevoo 2007). The reason behind this variable 
being included into this model, is to determine any 
manipulation of financial information applications 
based on increase in revenue or decrease in expense 
or vice versa within the framework of accrual basis. In 
this context, if this variable, in other words, non-cash 
working capital increases or decreases dramatically, it 
is assumed that manipulation of financial information 
takes place.
8. Leverage Index (LEVI)
 Leverage describes a company’s financial structure 
and measures the long-term risks of a company 
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(Abdullah & Ismail, 2008). The leverage index 
measures the ratio of total debt to total assets. An index 
of greater than 1.0 is interpreted as an increase in the 
gearing of the company and for that matter, exposed to 
manipulation (Mahama 2015). When an entity reaches 
M-score higher than -2.22, calculated from the above 
eight variables, the model assumes that it is probable 
that the entity has manipulated accounting data for 
the accounting period or is strongly motivated to 
manipulate accounting data (Beneish 2001; Drábková 
2014). 
 This model considers variables related to both the 
likelihood and incentives for fraud, and it allows the user 
to assess the different aspects of a firm’s performance 
simultaneously instead of reviewing them in isolation. 
It should be noted that this is a probabilistic model, 
so it will not detect manipulators with 100% accuracy. 
Using all the companies in the Compustat database 
between the years 1982-1992, Beneish found that the 
model correctly identifies 76% manipulators, whilst only 
incorrectly identifies 17.5% of non-manipulator. Over the 
past decades, a number of studies confirmed the ability 
of this model in detecting financial statement fraud. For 
instance, ACFE (2004), Küçükkocaoğlu et al. (2005), 
Cynthia (2005) and Schuetze (2007) suggested that this 
model can be used for identifying falsified financial 
statements and classifying indicators on the manipulation 
of financial information. It is also found that the model 
helps external auditors, forensic accountants/experts 
and certified fraud examiners to flag possible problem 
areas in the financial statement, considering its ability to 
distinguish and discriminate between manipulators and 
non-manipulators, especially as it has been successfully 
deployed by many researchers in assessing the financial 
statements of companies such as Enron, Worldcom, ZZZZ 
Best and other cases (Prevoo 2007). Recent studies such 
as Nwoye et al. (2013) and Omar et al. (2014) suggested 
that Beneish model effectively improves auditors’ 
chances of detecting fraud in the financial statements. 
As its acceptance has grown over the last years, the 
Beneish model is now being taught at universities 
globally and has become an accepted tool in detecting 
fraud in organizations. The findings report that this model 
correctly identifies 57 fraud cases out of 82 fraudulent 
firms determined by SC Malaysia (Table 4).
DECHOW F-SCORE
The F-model is developed by Dechow et al. (2011). It 
is a general fraud risk assessment tool that generates 
an output (F-score), an indication of the probability of 
fraudulent financial reporting. Dechow et al. (2011) 
followed a methodology similar to Beneish (1997, 1999) 
in developing a score to predict which companies have 
material accounting misstatements. The F-score model is 
claimed to be more comprehensive since it is based on an 
examination of all Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Releases (AAERs) issued by the SEC between 1982 and 
2005. while the Beneish study is based only on AAERs 
issued between 1982 and 1992. 
 In total, 28 variables clustered around 5 information 
types are tested on their capabilities of discriminating 
between the fraudulent firms and the non-fraudulent firms. 
The variables included are accrual quality, performance, 
non-financial measures, off-balance sheet activities 
and market-based measures. Consequently, 3 logistic 
regression models are estimated, resulting in models that 
retain respectively 7, 9 and 11 variables that have the 
most discriminatory power. Model 1 contains variables 
from the primary financial statements, Model 2 adds off-
balance sheet and non-financial measures, and Model 3 
adds market-related variables. Dechow et al. (2011) found 
that their first model offers the “bulk of the power” in 
predicting material accounting misstatements. This study 
uses model 1 of Dechow et al. (2011) because it only 
takes into consideration the financial ratios, and therefore 
consistent with the objective of this study.
Following Dechow et al. (2011), F-score is computed as 
follows:
 Value = -7.893 + 0.790*RSST + 2.518*ΔREC 
+ 1.191*ΔINV + 1.979*SOFTASSETS + 
0.171*ΔCASHSALES – 0.932*ΔROA + 
1.029*ISSUE
 The value is converted to a probability as follows: 
(VALUE)/ (1+ VALUE). The resulting probability is then 
divided by the unconditional probability of misstatement 
(=0.0037)1 to obtain the F-score. An F-Score of 1.00 
indicates that the firm has the same probability of 
misstatement as the unconditional expectation (the 
probability of misstatement when randomly selecting a firm 
from the population). F-Scores greater than one indicate 
higher probabilities of misstatement than the unconditional 
expectation. 
 
The detail explanation of each variable is discussed below:
9. RSST Accruals 
 This variable measures changes in current assets 
(excluding cash), less changes in current liabilities 
(excluding short-term debt) and depreciation. Also 
factored into it are changes in long term operating 
assets and long-term operating liabilities.
10. Change in Receivables
 The change in receivables from last year to this year 
is scaled by average total assets. It is indicated that 
large changes in accounts receivables show revenue 
and earnings manipulation. The manipulation can 
occur through the fraudulent recognition of revenue 
and large changes in accounts receivable falsified cash 
flows from operating activities.
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11. Change in Inventory
 The change in inventories from last year to this year 
is scaled by average total assets. Large changes in 
inventory may indicate inventory surpluses, shortages, 
obsolescence, or liquidation. For example, if the 
company uses the last-in first-out (LIFO) method of 
accounting for inventory in a period of rising prices, 
selling older inventory will result in lower cost of 
goods sold, i.e., LIFO liquidation of inventory units 
or layers. This practice leads to inflated earnings.
12. Soft Assets 
 This measure is defined as total assets less the sum of 
PP&E and cash and cash equivalents (scaled by total 
assets). It is suggested that when soft asset is high in 
the balance sheet, managers have more abilities to 
change and adjust assumptions to influence short-term 
earnings. 
13. Change in Cash Sales
 This measure is the percentage change in cash sales 
from last year to this year. For a firm not engaged in 
earnings manipulation, the growth rate in cash sales 
could be compared to the growth rate in revenues but 
these researchers did not include such an analysis. 
They argued and modelled that just the change in cash 
sales is a key metric to monitor when evaluating the 
potential for earning manipulation.
14. Change in ROA
 This measure is a percentage calculated as earnings 
divided by total assets this year less the same measure 
last year. Volatile earnings may be indicator of 
earnings manipulation. According to Dechow, Ge, 
Larson, and Sloan (2007), a consistent theme among 
manipulating firms is that they have shown strong 
performance prior to manipulation. The cause for such 
manipulation may be a current decline in performance, 
which the management team attempts to cover up by 
manipulating financial reporting.
15. Actual Issuance of Stock
 This measure is a dummy variable that is 1 if additional 
securities are issued during the manipulation year and 
is 0 if no such securities are issued. Such issuances 
may indicate operating cash flow problems that need to 
be offset by additional financing. In addition, issuance 
of stock may indicate management is exercising 
TABLE 3. Item analyses used as the F-score variables
Items Formulas 
RSST (ΔWC + ΔNCO + ΔFIN) / Average Total Assets
WC = [Current Assets – Cash and Short-term Investments] – [Current Liabilities 
– Debt in Current Liabilities];
NCO = [Total Assets – Current Assets – Investments and Advances – [Total 
Liabilities – Current Liabilities – Long-term Debt];
Fin = [Short-term Investments +Long-term Investments] – [Long-term Debt + 
Debt in Current Liabilities + Preferred Stock]
ΔREC Δ Accounts Receivables / Average Total Assets
ΔINV Δ Inventory / Average Total Assets
SOFTASSETS [Total assets – PPE – Cash and cash equivalents] / Total Assets
ΔCASHSALES Percentage change in cash sales [Sales – Δ Accounts Receivables]
ΔROA [Earnings t / Average total assets t] – [Earnings t-1 / Average total assets t-1]
ISSUE An indicator variable coded 1 if the firm issued securities during year t
TABLE 4. Comparison between Beneish and Dechow models
Beneish M-score Dechow F-score
Predicted Predicted
Observed Non-Fraudulent Fraudulent Non-
Fraudulent
Fraudulent
Non-Fraudulent 63
(76.83%)
19
(23.17%)
65
(79.26%)
17
(23.74%)
Fraudulent 25
(30.49%)
57
(69.51%)
22
(26.83%)
60
(73.17%)
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stock options. The exercise of stock options may 
signify that managers are attempting to sell at the top 
because they foresee future underperformance of the 
company. Such insider sales resulted in the criminal 
conviction of Qwest’s Chief Executive Officer and has 
been a significant non-financial red flag in many fraud 
cases, like Enron, Global Crossing, and WorldCom. 
For example, Qwest and Enron insiders made $2.1 
billion and $1.1 billion, respectively, by exercising and 
selling their stock options before their firms’ financial 
reporting problems became public. 
 
 The value of the study by Dechow et al. (2011) is also 
supported by the relatively high number citations it has 
received compared to other studies in this field. Several 
researchers had recently tested some variables of Dechow 
model and found empirical support for them (Cecchini et 
al. 2010; Lennox & Pittman 2010; Price III et al. 2010). It 
is also suggested that the ability of F-model in detecting 
companies subject to SEC AAER’s is better compared to the 
Beneish model (Price III et al. 2010). 
COMPARISON BETWEEN MODELS
Clearly, both techniques can be used to detect fraud in 
financial data as the predictive ability of both models is 
higher than 70%. Table 4 compares the statistics between 
the two models. The findings suggest that Dechow F-score 
provides higher accuracy in detecting fraud compared to 
the Beneish model. 
 Furthermore, as suggested by Cleary and Thibodeau 
(2005), the error rates of the fraud detection models should 
be examined by considering Type I and Type II errors. A 
Type I error occurs when the model wrongly classifies a 
fraudulent company as a non-fraudulent company. A Type 
II error occurs when the model wrongly classifies a non-
fraudulent company as a fraudulent company. The cost 
of these two types of errors is different for each type of 
users. From auditors’ point of view, Type II error is more 
costly than Type I. When a fraud case is not detected on 
time and is revealed later, the auditor is going to be sued 
by investors or sanctioned by the regulators. On the other 
hand, Type I error is related to efficiency and may result 
in auditor losing client or decreasing their margin of profit 
in an engagement. Since Type II error which is related to 
audit effectiveness is more costly to the auditors, a model 
that makes lower Type II error would be preferable to the 
auditors. 
 As indicated in Table 5, the Type I error rate of 
Beneish model is 30.49%. This result for Dechow model 
is found to be 26.83%. The Type II error for Beneish and 
Dechow models are 23.17% % and 20.73% respectively. 
The results confirmed the efficiency of F-score in 
detecting fraud cases (73.17%) compared to Beneish 
model (69.51%). In conclusion, the performance of 
Dechow F-score model with lower Type II error (20.73%) 
and correct classification (76.21%) is found to outperform 
the Beneish model in detecting fraud cases. 
CONCLUSION
Fraud is a serious problem that has plagued the business 
community. The concerns of preventing fraud are 
mounting as the occurrences and negative impact of fraud 
have escalated over the years. Financial statement fraud is 
found to be the most worrying as it involves management 
of the company and causes the highest loss to investors. 
Several mathematical models have been developed to help 
regulators and auditors to detect fraud early.
 This study responds to the concerns of the public and 
the policy makers by identifying an appropriate model 
associated with financial statement fraud. This study 
examines whether the Beneish M-score and Dechow 
F-score (2011) fit and have the association with financial 
statements fraud in relation to Malaysian fraud cases. These 
models use financial ratios which are readily and publicly 
available from companies’ annual reports. The results 
indicate that the ability of Dechow F-score in detecting 
fraud is higher than Beneish model; whereby it predicts 
73.17% of fraud cases correctly compared to 69.51%. 
The Type II error also is reported to be lower in Dechow 
model compared to Beneish model. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that Dechow F-score fits more to Malaysian 
financial statement fraud cases from the year 2000 until 
2014. The limitation of this study is the utilisation of fraud 
models which are limited to financial data; hence, non-
financial data which play important role in detecting fraud 
are ignored. The future studies are suggested to compare 
these financial models with other fraud models comprising 
financial and non-financial variables such as fraud triangle 
model or fraud diamond model. In addition, future studies 
can examine the performance of these models amongst 
ASEAN countries. 
NOTE
1.  Unconditional probability of misstatement is equal to 
the number of misstatement firms divided by the total 
number of firms in Dechow et al.’s (2011) sample.
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